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The research project from which this article is drawn investigates processes of 
regional governance in two cognate yet distinctive regions: Wales and Brittany. It is a 
binary comparison that does not pretend to exhaust the possibilities of other binary or 
multivariate comparisons. Starting from the premise that the common challenges of 
regional governance are at least as important as its institutional variations, we engage 
in three distinct exercises in comparative investigation; at the level of policy 
communities (through in-depth interviews in the two regions) issue-networks ( via a 
detailed questionnaire) and public opinion (through a mass opinion poll carried out in 
both regions in July-August 2001).2  This article presents some important results of 
the attitudinal surveys carried out in Wales and Brittany in 2001. These findings 
illustrate what people living in Wales and Brittany think of their regions and how they 
envisage their future development.  
 
Why compare Wales and Brittany? Before addressing this issue, we need to determine 
what is the function of comparison?  For policy-makers, comparison is bound up with 
practical politics. Within the policy community, comparison is envisaged primarily in 
aspirational terms. This process is important, as the National Assembly for Wales is 
currently working out its diplomatic priorities.  The most obvious comparators are 
those within the UK itself, as the Welsh look with some envy on the Scottish 
Parliament with its primary legislative and tax-raising powers.  Outside of the UK, 
Welsh policy-makers look to regions such as Catalonia, or to nation-states such as 
Ireland or Denmark as models3.  These comparisons are sometimes quite unrealistic. 
Wales compares itself with the Irish Republic or the Scandanavian democracies, but 
does not yet possess the requisite political sovereignty to make such a comparison  
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meaningful.  Unlike Ireland or Denmark, Wales is not an EU member-state. Others 
look to Spanish regions such as Catalonia, which share a similar model of 
asymmetrical devolution to that of Wales within the UK. Or, indeed, to German 
länder, which appear as important nodes within the evolving EU multilayered polity. 
Or again to Canada, which has institutionalised the bilingual society to which many in 
Wales aspire. There is obviously much to be said for comparing Wales and Catalonia 
or a Canadian province.  But, whatever their merits, such comparisons are broadly 
aspirational; they present an idealised vision of what Wales might become. The 
economic and demographic underpinnings for such comparisons need to be 
demonstrated in a more rigorous manner than is usually the case.   
 
Our interest as academics is rather different. Through comparison, we seek to 
illustrate diversity, as well as similarity. The comparisons we seek to draw are multi-
dimensional ones. We are interested in the analytically separate dimensions of 
national context, regional identity, public policy and popular legitimisation. We 
contrast distinct traditions of territorial administration in France and Britain, but 
concentrate our attention on two regions – Wales and Brittany -  facing many similar 
structural challenges and strategic choices. Through making comparisons in the area 
of education and training and language policy management, we seek to identify useful 
lessons for policy-makers on both sides of the channel.  On the basis of successfully 
commissioned mass opinion surveys in Wales and Brittany, we are able to test the 
underlying legitimacy of new forms of regional governance.  
 
We have identified the Wales-Brittany pair as being the most appropriate within the 
overarching context of Franco-British comparisons. We argue that the mix of 
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similarity and difference makes the Wales-Brittany pair excellent for comparative 
analysis, in terms of their physical location, their population size, their economic 
activity, their linguistic specificity, and – not least – their common historical ties. Of 
course, there are important institutional differences between the two. The powers of 
French regions are much weaker than  those of National Assembly for Wales.  In this 
respect, the project starts from a position of qualitative difference between France and 
Britain.  The British Union state was always far more flexible than its French unitary 
counterpart. On balance, however, the UK has more in common with the unitary state 
tradition than it does with the federal one. This historical dimension of the comparison 
is deeply important for understanding how the predominant state tradition is perceived 
in regions with strong identity such as Wales and Brittany.  Before considering in 
some detail our comparative opinion poll findings, we now present the Brittany region 
within its national context. 
 
A French Region with a difference: Brittany 
 
One of the most distinctive regions of France, Brittany has a strong sense of its 
specific position within French society (Favereau, 1993, Flatres, 1986, Ford, 1993, Le 
Bourdonnec, 1996, Le Coadic, 1998, Martray, 1983).  Formerly an independent 
Duchy (from 818 to 1532), then a French province with special prerogatives (1532-
1789), reduced for long to being a collection of disparate départements before 
becoming an administrative then political region, modern Brittany is a French region 
with a difference. Unlike many other French regions, Brittany can look to its past 
existence as an independent nation-state, with an elaborate set of state institutions and 
founding myths. Though the symbols of statehood have long been repressed, the 
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region retains many distinctive characteristics. The Breton language is the European 
continent’s only Celtic language. The enduring symbolic importance of the Catholic 
religion is ever present physically in the architecture of Breton villages, as well in 
higher than average rates of religious practice. The spectacular growth of Breton 
cultural movements (danse, theatre, costume) is testament to a revival of Breton 
values and self-consciousness. At a more abstract level, observers have noted the 
capacity of Breton actors to join forces to promote their common interests and to 
defend Brittany against attacks from the outside world (Martray, 1983). Breton 
solidarity can also be gauged more intuitively by the effectiveness of Breton elite-
level networks in Paris and Brussels, and by the importance of the Breton diaspora in 
retaining a sense of distinctiveness.   
 
The dominant political culture is one of political accommodation. Breton politicians 
of all parties, however divided they are internally, will tend to close ranks against 
threats from the outside. Despite a strong regional identity, however, Brittany has not 
produced significant regionalist parties, or at least parties which have been capable of 
winning seats in departmental, regional or national elections. Only one left-wing 
regionalist party, the Union Démocratique Bretonne (UDB) has managed some 
victories at the municipal level and then usually in collaboration with the Socialist 
Party. Le Coadic (1998)  interprets this phenomenon as a consequence of the deeply 
rooted legitimist strand within Breton public opinion. Imbued by a Catholic, 
conformist ethic, the Breton public is not prepared to support pro-independence or 
pro-autonomist parties. We should also note that the mainstream political parties in 
Brittany have adopted regionalist themes and are more ‘regionalist’ than their national 
counterparts. This is true even of the Gaullist (RPR) President of the Brittany Region, 
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Josselin De Rohan, who has a much more ‘regionalist’ discourse than his RPR 
colleagues in most of the rest of France. Although Breton regionalism has, at times, 
been violent, this never reached the levels experienced in Corsica, the Spanish Basque 
country or Northern Ireland.   
 
Brittany is sometimes  taken as a litmus test for the health of regional identity within 
France. In post-war Brittany, there has been a strong political consensus among the 
regional elites in favour of  enhanced regionalisation. From 1950 onwards, Breton 
actors of all political persuasions co-operated closely in the CELIB  - Comité de 
d’étude et de liaison des intérêts bretons –  the archetype of a post-war  regional 
advocacy coalition.  The CELIB could claim the credit for many of the improvements 
in transport infrastructure consented to the Brittany region in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Brittany is probably the most distinctive region in mainland France today. This 
distinctiveness adds a foresight dimension to the Wales - Brittany comparison. 
Brittany is the birthplace and driving force of regional political identity (and 
institutions) in France and, if UK style devolution ever comes to France, it will 
undoubtedly prosper in Brittany more than anywhere else.  
 
 
Where should decisions be made? Public Opinion and Political Institutions in 
Wales and Brittany (2000) 
 
 
The questions we asked in our comparative opinion polls were general ones 
attempting to capture the rather different situations in Wales and Brittany.  There is a 
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difference, of course, between Wales and Brittany. Wales has a fairly long history of 
administrative decentralisation, and a recent history of political devolution (Jones and 
Osmond, 2002, Cheney, Hall and Pithouse, 2001, Marinetto, 2001, McAllister, 2000).  
Brittany has a history of more limited administrative decentralisation and a longer, but 
weaker, political decentralisation (Cole and John, 2001). Before analysing the poll 
findings in more detail, we now briefly compare and contrast the distinctive features 
of Welsh devolution and French decentralisation.  
 
Wales had a history of administrative devolution from 1964 to 1999, which laid the 
foundations for a more autonomous form of regional governance. Many areas of 
public policy were, de facto, managed by Welsh civil servants acting independently of 
their Whitehall colleagues, with minimal supervision exercised by a Secretary of State 
and two junior ministers. Though subject to the political inconsistencies of UK 
governments and the sensitivities of successive Secretaries of State, civil servants in 
the Welsh office were usually left to get on with the serious business of policy 
implementation. The model of executive devolution contained  in the Government of 
Wales Act (GWA) of 1998 is heavily imbued with the legacy of the Welsh Office, 
from the precise functions transferred to the key civil service personnel involved in 
assuring the transition (Rawlings, 1998, Cole and Storer, 2002).   
 
After the narrowest of victories for the Yes campaign in the 1997 referendum, the 
Government of Wales Act (1988) created a National Assembly with secondary 
legislative powers, rather than with primary legislative and budgetary powers as in 
Scotland.  In the Welsh model of executive devolution, there is an implicit division of 
labour between the devolved and central governments (Rawlings, 2001; Patchett, 
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2000).  The core functions of the state remain with central government.  These are 
defence, taxation, social security, immigration and nationality laws.  The Government 
of Wales Act transfers eighteen fields but there is no precise, constitutionally based 
division as in a genuine federal system. The Assembly ‘has the exact powers of the 
Secretary of State’, though the Secretary of State had been part of central government 
with a voice in cabinet. The powers transferred to the Assembly were those of the old 
Welsh Office, powers that had evolved in an arbitrary and haphazard matter, usually 
reflecting different traditions within Whitehall departments.  Consistent with the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, and the principle of secondary legislative 
powers, Westminister retains legislative pre-eminence even in transferred areas.  
Conforming to the traditional local government model, moreover, the Assembly can 
only act where it has precise statutory responsibilities. It can not invest itself with new 
responsibilities, nor can it raise additional sources of finance.  It can, however, make 
primary legislation within secondary legislation (through statutory instruments and 
circulars), which vests it with a distinct policy formulation role.  For one of the 
architects of devolution, the only advantage of this hybrid and obfuscated system was 
that it helped to deliver devolution to Wales.  The Welsh public, apathetic when not 
antipathetic, would not have accepted a bolder scheme. 
 
 
However we define devolution in Wales, the Brittany regional council’s functions are 
weaker. The regional institution in France is the result of a long process of what might 
be called “creeping institutionalisation” as it was gradually (and grudgingly) granted a 
position in the politico-administrative system alongside the départements and the 
communes (Dupiorier, 1998, Nay, 1997, Loughlin and Mazey, 1995). Brittany 
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became an administrative region in the late 1950s, acquiring its own indirectly elected 
regional authority in 1972. The 1982 decentralisation reforms introduced direct 
elections4 for the regional councils in 1982 (operational since 1986) and reinforced 
their policy responsibilities. It is important to stress the limited character of French 
decentralisation and regionalisation. The regional institution was established while 
retaining the longer established and, in many ways, more powerful départements. 
Large cities and towns had also become powerful levels of subnational government 
(Cole and John, 2001). The regions might, therefore, be considered the poor cousins 
of French subnational government. Decentralisation  in Brittany (and throughout 
France) is  less overtly linked with territorial identity than in the case of Wales or 
Scotland. Regional structures do not respect the informal boundaries of France’s 
historic regions. Thus the French Basque country - squeezed into the Midi Pyrenées – 
does not even have its own département. Alsace and Lorraine are two separate 
regions. Historic Brittany has been divided ever since Marshall Petain’s decision to 
remove the Loire Atlantique département (and its capital Nantes) from Brittany in 
1941. To allow France’s historic regions to exist would be tantamount to admitting 
the existence of a union state of the UK variety, rather than the French unitary 
version. Decentralisation was not intended to give political recognition to specific 
‘ethnic’ groups within France. The only partial exception to this rule is Corsica which 
has had a specific statute since 1982.  
 
Decentralisation in France was supposed to promote better governance, not to 
challenge the underlying principles of the French unitary state.  There is no real 
equivalent in Brittany of the National Assembly’s capacity to adapt primary 
Westminister legislation.  There are examples in the overseas French territories, in 
 10 
New Caledonia and French Polynesia especially.  The Matignon agreements, if ever 
implemented, would give the Corsican Assembly the power to adapt primary 
legislation and make regulations. Nowhere in mainland France, however, is UK style 
devolution yet on the agenda.  But the regional councils do have precise legal 
responsibilities in economic development, secondary education, training, transport 
and several other fields. Moreover, elected French Regions have limited tax-varying 
powers that are not available to the National Assembly for Wales.  They have used 
their powers ambitiously and are actively seeking new powers. The republican belief 
that all parts of the French territory must be treated exactly the same is increasingly 
contested, not least from Breton politicians and public opinion.  
 
Though Wales and Brittany represent distinctive forms of political decentralisation, 
our polling evidence reveals a strong demand in both regions for effective regional 
political institutions.  
 
 
----Table One around here ---- 
 
 
How should we interpret these findings? Let us first consider the case of Brittany, 
where regional institutions are well-established. In Brittany, as in Wales, we observe 
overwhelming support for consolidating or strengthening existing regional 
institutions. There is virtually no constituency for the status quo ante; regional 
institutions are fully accepted as part of the normal democratic process. Breton 
opinion is very evenly divided between those satisfied with existing arrangements 
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(44%) and those advocating either an Assembly with legislative and tax-raising 
powers (33%) or an ‘autonomous’ Brittany (12%). These findings confirm the 
existence of a Breton regional political consciousness. They leave entirely open the 
question of whether the Breton public would support a more thoroughgoing regional 
or federal evolution.  This survey question has been asked in no other mainland 
French region, but the consensus expert view emphasises the complex pattern of  
multiple Breton identities and a willingness to envisage more advanced forms of 
political decentralisation than elsewhere in France (Pillet, 2001). As in Wales, the 
autonomy solution is confined to the margins of the political spectrum, a discovery 
confirmed by the absence of support for a strong autonomist political movement. 
 
Our poll not only indicates strong support for regional political institutions in 
Brittany, but also a desire to strengthen the regional over the local, national and 
European levels in specific areas (notably education, training and language, our fields 
of policy investigation). Following the annual surveys conducted by the Paris-based 
think tank the OIP (Observatoire Interrégional du Politique), these trends are more 
pronounced in Brittany than elsewhere. This sense of regional ownership is well 
demonstrated by our Brittany-specific question on the administrative reunification of 
the historic Brittany region. Historic Brittany consisted of five départements, 
stretching from the far western Atlantic coast to the Loire. During the wartime 
authoritarian regime of Marshall Pétain,  Loire Atlantique (and its capital Nantes) was 
separated from the rest of Brittany.  Recovering the Loire-Atlantique has been a 
rallying cry of the Breton political movement ever since 1941. Our poll suggests 
strong public support for the reunification of historic Brittany (61%). This attachment 
to the physical embodiment of historic Brittany is itself a powerful form of 
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‘regionality effect’. Our survey demonstrates that it is shared across the political and 
geographical spectrum, with only minor variations according to département, partisan 
allegiance or other variables. 
 
In Wales, the poll was primarily designed to measure general attitudes towards 
devolution in Wales and the National Assembly during the first two years of its 
operation. By any measure the National Assembly’s formative years have been 
stormy. The wafer thin majority in the 1997 referendum raised doubts about the 
commitment of the Welsh voters and the legitimacy of the whole project. The 
departure of one Welsh  Secretary (Ron Davies) and the appointment of another (Alun 
Michael) generally regarded as having been imposed by Tony Blair did little to 
enhance the devolutionary process. Furthermore, the failure of the Welsh Labour 
Party to win an overall majority in the first Assembly elections frustrated the 
expectation of strong and consistent policies, arguably one of the main justifications 
for devolution. The resultant scenario of ‘all-party inclusive policy- making’ was less 
than convincing and eventually led to Alun Michael losing a vote of ‘no confidence’. 
It was against this background of institutional initiatives, political experimentation 
and plain damage limitation that our poll of Welsh public opinion was taken in late 
June 2001. 
 
The results presented in Table One are remarkable on three counts. Only 24% 
supported the pre- devolution arrangements. The prediction by Ron Davies that 
devolution would be a process rather than an event appeared to have been vindicated. 
Furthermore, 49% of respondents supported the strengthening of the National 
Assembly to give it powers at least equivalent to those of the Scottish Parliament.  
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This shift in public opinion is consistent with the majority view encountered in over 
40 interviews in and around the National Assembly that the current system suffers 
from a lack of clarity and a confused and unworkable attribution of functions. Our in-
depth interviews demonstrated a deep-seated dissatisfaction with the devolution 
introduced by the Government of Wales Act and a desire to move towards primary 
legislative powers. The Welsh, while never the constitutional pacesetters, now look to 
follow Scotland's lead.  
 
 
Other findings from the poll confirmed the Welsh public’s more positive attitude to 
the devolution process in Wales. When asked the question ‘What are your personal 
views on devolution for Wales, that is the creation of the National Assembly for 
Wales, which has taken over responsibility for areas such as health and education in 
Wales ?’.,a majority (51%) were in favour or strongly in favour of devolution, with 
only 32% against. 5  There would appear to have been a shift in popular opinion since 
the Welsh referendum in 1997.  When moving on to ask more specific questions 
about the effectiveness of the National Assembly, the Welsh people appeared to be 
less confident about the Assembly. Firstly, the majority (60%) of those asked 
disagreed with the statement that ‘ The quality of public services has improved under 
the Assembly’, indicating that the Welsh public is still waiting for ‘the Assembly to 
deliver’. This is to be expected. The Assembly was only two years old during the 
polling exercise and only in the longer term will it be able to impact on the deep- 
seated economic and social problems facing the country. On the issue of whether the 
existence of the Assembly has democratised political processes in Wales, respondents 
were split almost evenly, with a small majority against the proposition that ‘The say of 
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people in decision-making has improved under the Assembly’. This is an immediate 
problem for the Assembly which appears to reflect the general disillusionment with 
politics in the UK, indicated by the low general election turnout of 2001.  The 
Assembly still needs to convince a large section of the Welsh public that devolution is 
bringing Welsh politics closer to the Welsh people.  Proponents of devolution and the 
Welsh Assembly Government  in particular will take comfort from the slight majority 
of people who agreed that ‘‘The existence of the Assembly has given Wales more 
lobbying power within the UK government’.   This view represents quite a 
sophisticated assessment, recognising on the one hand the limited nature of the 
legislative powers devolved to Wales and , on the other,  the enhanced lobbying 
capacity exercised by a ‘democratic Assembly’ compared  with a Secretary of State 
heading  a small central government department. We draw the conclusion, as in the 
Western Mail leader, that public opinion is ‘warming to the Assembly’. 
 
 
We deduce a strong underpinning of support for regional political institutions in 
Wales and Brittany. But these basic similarities mask essential differences between 
Wales and Brittany. This becomes apparent when we consider preferences for 
regional expenditure.  
 
What priorities for regional action? Public Opinion and Public Policy in Wales 
and Brittany (1500 Max) 
 
Regional public spending priorities are indicative not only of actual policy choices, 
but also of the appropriateness of public intervention of different levels in specific 
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policy fields. Even in the most federally inclined system, it would be difficult to 
imagine defence expenditure being a major priority for a sub-central authority. The 
survey proceeded to ask an open-ended question  (‘If your region had more money to 
spend, where should its first two priorities lie’) seeking to elicit the Welsh and Breton 
public’s preferences for regional public expenditure.  Table Two presents a hierarchy 
of the first preferences. We now consider the implications of these figures for Wales 
and Brittany.  
 
---- Table Two around here ---- 
 
 
Public opinion in Wales has fully integrated the significance of devolution into its 
thinking.  Its priorities for future regional expenditure involve generic spending areas 
– such as health and education -  rather than more narrowly defined Welsh interests 
such as culture or language. The priorities for Assembly expenditure are broadly in 
line with those of the UK as a whole.  Health and education are the overwhelming 
concerns, with the Welsh electorate demonstrating an awareness that the Assembly 
now makes many essential decisions in these areas.6 Health and education are two 
areas where the Assembly has been devolved powers to define and apply Welsh 
solutions. The lessons for the Assembly are mixed. On the one hand, the saliency of 
these issue-areas justifies the search for Welsh solutions to intractable  policy 
problems ( of educational underachievement or of health standards  below the UK 
average)7. On the other hand, not only do health and education present seemingly 
irresolvable policy dilemmas, both fields also contain their own complex pre-existing 
actor systems and their own path dependencies. Health and education symbolise the 
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semi-sovereign nature of Assembly policy making. There is a gulf between the 
expectations placed on the Assembly and the constraints of interdependent, semi-
sovereign politics (Cole and Storer, 2002).  There is no general legislative 
competency for the Assembly in these devolved areas: the Assembly can only act 
where it has a statutory basis for action.  The Assembly can decide to shift resources 
to health or education, but some other policy field will lose out. As ‘Treasury rules’ 
apply to Wales, the Treasury continues to control the purse strings. Without tax-
varying powers, the Assembly depends upon executive-led negotiations with the 
Treasury, which are undertaken by the Secretary of State and not by the Assembly 
itself (which must, however, be consulted). 
 
That the Assembly makes a difference is not in doubt, however.  The existence of the 
Assembly has proved a powerful bargaining chip with the Treasury, testified by the 
resources obtained by the Assembly in the last two budgetary rounds. The Assembly 
can engage many reforms which are resource neutral: the power of the purse does not 
determine everything.  The Assembly’s  impact can be demonstrated in the sphere of 
education and lifelong learning, one of our fields of investigation.  The Assembly has 
abolished the TECs and created a new complex new institutional structure co-
ordinated by ELWa. In the field of pre-16 education, the Assembly has rejected 
premier Blair’s specialist schools and pledged to retain the comprehensive system.  
The Assembly has also rejected all private finance initiatives in education.  But 
education is an area of interdependent policy-making and the Assembly does not 
exercise control over all secondary legislation concerning education in Wales. One 
interviewee lamented the fact that ‘since devolution, more secondary legislation 
affecting Wales on education has been passed through the Westminster parliament 
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than the Assembly’. Teacher pay and conditions in particular were entirely decided by 
London. In the area of health, the Assembly has reformed the structures of healthcare 
(the creation of area-wide NHS offices) and enacted a number of symbolic egalitarian 
measures (such as free eye tests for pensioners) but the specific solutions it can adopt 
are limited within the structures of the NHS as it currently exists.  
 
The counterpart to Welsh electorate’s concern with health and education is that other 
Assembly priorities – such as the environment, social inclusion, transport, urban 
development and rural assistance – did not figure highly in the public’s perceptions of 
important spending priorities.   This hierarchy confirms the polity building dimension 
of Welsh devolution that we explore below.  While polity building is deeply 
satisfying,  there is a danger that the Assembly (and the Welsh Assembly Government 
in particular) will be identified in the eyes of public opinion as a rather distant 
Cardiff-based administration rather than a proximate authority bringing decision-
making closer to the people.  
 
 
In Brittany, the findings differ in important respects from those observed in Wales, 
where health and education dominated popular preferences.  These results do not 
imply that the Breton public cares less about health and education than in Wales. In 
the Breton case, expenditure priorities demonstrated a realistic appraisal of the limited 
powers of the French regions much more than a disinterest in the areas of health and 
education. Breton public opinion has fully integrated the constraints of 
decentralisation into its preferences.  It is because health and education are not 
identified as areas of regional policy intervention that they do not appear as high 
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priorities for regional expenditure.   We would certainly not expect health to top the 
list of spending priorities for a French regional Assembly. The French system of 
health care is elaborately – and expensively – managed by a social partnership of 
employers and trade unions, increasingly closely monitored by the central state. The 
regions do not have any responsibilities therein (though the départements do).  The 
low ranking of education is rather more intriguing. Though France prides itself on its 
national education system, implying uniform standards and practices throughout the 
country, French regions also have important responsibilities in secondary and higher 
education. The regions build and maintain upper secondary schools (lycées) and some 
universities, provide equipment, participate in educational planning and – of great 
importance in Brittany – can make grants to private schools.  Education is by far the 
largest spending post of all French regions, around 50% in the case of Brittany.  We 
surmise that, though there is intense interest in Brittany in education, this issue area is 
perceived primarily either as a national or a more localised policy responsibility. The 
Regional councils have not yet drawn much political capital from their major 
budgetary investment in education over the past fifteen years. Education is one area 
where the central state has succeeded in shedding responsibilities to the periphery 
(regional councils and state field services) while retaining strategic control (Balme, 
1999).  
 
Unlike in Wales, in the case of Brittany the public’s expenditure preferences pinpoint 
issues of specific regional importance, rather than generic spending areas. They 
suggest a strong ‘regional effect’. The first priority was the environment. 
Environmental issues are high on the political agenda in Brittany, which has to face 
specific challenges unknown to most other French regions. The second priority for 
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regional expenditure identified in the survey is economic development. There is an 
established post-war tradition of public intervention in supporting the Breton 
economy, whether through direct investment or through providing transport 
infrastructure. By distinguishing economic development as the second priority for 
regional expenditure, the Breton public again identified an area where regional action 
could (or should) make a difference. Amongst the other priorities for regional 
expenditure we can identify two further areas closely linked to the specific attributes 
of Brittany: tourism and culture. Brittany is one of France’s major tourist regions. 
That Bretons look to the regional authority to promote tourism supports the proximity 
argument; regional investment is appropriate because the Region has detailed 
knowledge of local conditions.  We might make a similar observation with respect to 
culture. It is entirely appropriate for the regional authority to promote culture, not 
only because culture is worth promoting, but also because it has a strong regional 
dimension. 
 
In Wales and Brittany, we subjected two policy areas to more intense scrutiny: 
training and regional languages.  In Brittany, as in Wales, support for expenditure on 
regional languages was very low down the list of popular priorities  -  fewer than one 
per cent of first preferences in both cases. We should exercise some caution when 
interpreting this figure. Priorities for public expenditure do not automatically equate 
with issue saliency.  In an area such as support for regional languages, policy 
objectives might be achieved with minimal additional public expenditure.  In Wales 
(50%) and in Brittany (53%) a majority of respondents identified the National 
Assembly for Wales, or the Brittany Regional Council as the appropriate level for 
decision-making on language-related issues.  The findings for training policy provide 
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further support for the regional level in both countries. Welsh and Breton public 
opinion was remarkably similar in preferring the regional institution as the ‘primary 
political institution making decisions in the area of training policy’, rather than the 
EU, national government or local government.8 
 
 
Our second series of questions lead us to refine our argument somewhat. A logic of 
appropriateness appears to be at work. Whether consciously or not, the Welsh public 
appears to have integrated the evolutionary character of devolution into its 
calculations. It looks to the Assembly (in an exaggerated manner) to concentrate its 
resources on remedying deep- rooted problems in health and education. To all extents 
and purposes, the Welsh public implores its Assembly to act as a government, divided 
opinions over devolution notwithstanding.  The Breton public wants regional public 
expenditure to be concentrated in areas where regional institutions might make a 
difference, or where the image of Brittany itself is involved. We might conceive of 
this as a bounded regionality. There is no equivalent process of state building to that 
one might infer from the findings in Wales.  Health and education provide a useful 
contrast to training and regional languages. In the core areas of health and education, 
even in regionally minded Brittany, there is a preference for a system of national 
regulation, consistent with French public service doctrine, equality of standards and 
the legacy of 150 years of ‘republican’ ideology.  
 
 
Institutions, identities and voting intentions in Wales and Brittany  
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How best can we comprehend these institutional viewpoints in Wales and Brittany ?  
Full analysis of the structural and attitudinal variables contained in the poll lies 
outside of the scope of the present article.  We will limit our analysis here to two 
criteria  - multiple identities and intended voting behaviour in an Assembly or 
regional election - which allow for meaningful comparisons to be drawn between 
Welsh and Breton public opinion.  
  
Does identity matter? We asked respondents in both surveys to state whether they 
considered themselves to be more Welsh than British (more Breton than French), 
equally Welsh and British  (equally Breton and French) or more British than Welsh ( 
more  French than Breton ).  The results are presented in Table Three 
 
 
----- Table Three  around here ---- 
 
 
The table is highly revealing. A far higher proportion of the Welsh survey – around 
one-third -  considered itself to be exclusively or primarily Welsh than was the case in 
Brittany. A sense of Welshness as being essentially opposed to Britishness is firmly 
rooted in a sizeable minority of Welsh people.  In Brittany, by contrast, the sense of 
regional identity is strong, but this is not considered as being in opposition to an 
overarching French nationhood. Regional identity is not a surrogate nationality.  This 
finding is consistent with the mainstream portrayal of Breton political culture and 
society we investigated above. There is much less of a conflict between Breton and 
French identities than is the case for Wales and the UK. The greatest difference 
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between Wales and Brittany therefore lies not so much in institutional preferences for 
the future, as in the linkage between national and regional identities. Multiple 
identities are more easily assumed in Brittany than in Wales.   
 
Simple cross-tabulations suggest that in the two cases there is some sort of 
relationship between identity and institutional preferences. Clear relationships were 
established between identity and institutional preferences at the two extremes. Those 
considering themselves to be uniquely or predominantly Welsh or Breton were far 
more likely to advocate either a Scottish-style parliament or independence (autonomy 
in the case of Brittany) than were those considering themselves to be primarily or 
entirely British or French. There also appears to be some sort of relationship between 
the ability to speak a regional language (Breton or Welsh) and an institutional 
preference in favour of greater regionalisation or autonomy. Our poll suggests that 
fluency in the Welsh language appears to be a major explanatory factor of 
institutional preferences. Those declaring themselves to be fluent in Welsh (some 12 
per cent ) were more likely to espouse an independent Wales than those with little or 
no knowledge of the language. A similar finding was observed in Brittany, though the 
numbers were smaller. 
 
 
---Tables Four and Five around here --- 
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---- Tables  Six  and Seven around here --- 
 
 
Do partisan preferences matter? We asked both populations how they intended to vote 
if a general or a regional election were to be held tomorrow. We then cross-tabulated 
regional voting intention with institutional preferences (and, in the case of Brittany, 
with attitudes towards recovering the Loire Atlantique). In Brittany, we observed 
surprisingly few differences according to voting intention. PS voters were scarcely 
more favourable than RPR voters to enhanced regional autonomy.  Though we must 
treat these figures with caution, they bear out the belief expressed in many interviews 
that institutional preferences cut across existing parties. Institutional choices can not 
be reduced to a simple left-right cleavage. The RPR President of the Brittany Region, 
Josselin de Rohan, might have a sceptical position on greater autonomy, but many 
RPR voters did not share this view.  Likewise, while the PS leader Jean-Yves Le 
Drian has repositioned the Socialist Party in favour of greater regional autonomy, 
more Socialist voters are happy with existing arrangements than in favour of a 
Scottish-style parliament. These findings are consistent with existing representations 
of Breton political cleavages. There is a moderation of political conflict within the 
Brittany arena. Moreover, national political parties are infused with Breton cultural 
values. There is also a distrust of political extremes, except in specific sub-cultural 
circumstances. While not going as far as to suggest a cross-partisan consensus on the 
broad issues facing Brittany, there is an underlying consensus to defend Breton 
interests to the outside world and limit political conflict.  
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Such a consensus is less obviously apparent in the case of Wales. Within the Welsh 
electorate, we can identity three distinct positions, ranging from a residual 
Conservative hostility to the principle of devolution, to overwhelming support from 
intending Plaid voters for at least a Scottish-style parliament, with Labour and Liberal 
democrats occupying a median position favourable to going beyond executive 
devolution.  Rather like the AMs interviewed, few support the existing settlement, 
with the status quo option arriving in third position in each electorate (‘retain an 
elected Assembly with limited powers’).  Executive devolution appears as the hollow 
core of regional governance in Wales. 
 
Our findings are nonetheless remarkable. Only the Conservative electorate continues 
to oppose devolution, by a small margin.  Devolution is a cleavage that has 
traditionally cut across existing political parties, most especially the Labour Party.  
The principle of an elected Assembly/Parliament is now accepted overwhelmingly in 
each electorate, except that of the Conservatives.  While divisions remain in each 
party, the centre of gravity amongst intending Labour and Liberal Democrats voters 
(the governing coalition) has shifted beyond accepting devolution towards advocating 
a Scottish-style parliament.  The Plaid Cymru electorate is the most cohesive, in its 
large majority dissatisfied with the limited devolution introduced by the Government 
of Wales Act. 
 
We can observe this paradigm shift in favour of devolution  in operation at the level 
of political practice and inter-party relations. The founding fathers were convinced 
that the majoritarian traditions of Westminster politics would be inappropriate for 
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Wales.  The rhetorical commitment to all-inclusive politics implied new forms of 
cross-party dialogue and the involvement of non-governing parties in policy-making 
decisions. The arrival in power of Rhodri Morgan and the creation of the Labour-
Liberal Democrat coalition in September 2000 marked two important watersheds in 
the history of Welsh politics. The victory of Rhodri Morgan represented the coming 
of age of a specifically Welsh Labour party, cognisant above all of its core territorial 
interests.  Party opponents, even when critical of the coalition, recognise the 
emancipation of the Welsh Labour Party. The formation of the Lib-Lab coalition was 
difficult to square with ‘all-inclusivity’, especially as Rhodri Morgan does not conceal 
his preference for a single-party administration after the 2003 elections. In some 
important respects, however, all Welsh parties have moved closer together since 1999. 
There is general agreement across all parties that the Assembly’ s powers need to be 
revised,  though institutional preferences differ greatly. For the UK-based parties, 
moreover, there is an awareness that devolution encourages a territorial adjustment of 
their core political message. Even the Welsh Conservatives have learned this lesson.  
In extensive interviews in and around the National Assembly in 2001 and 2002, 
Assembly members from all parties expressed strong demands for new powers 
Deprived of full legislative powers in the transferred domains, the National Assembly 
lacks the legal and political means for its policy ambitions.  Even the Conservative 
group accepted that a clarification of the Assembly’s powers was essential; such a 
clarification will await the next election at the earliest. 
 
In association with a narrowing of positions within and between parties, our findings 
also suggest that traditional regional cleavages have lessened in intensity.  The gap 
between  those regions most favourable and least favourable to devolution is only  
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9%.9 There is little regional difference in the preferences for future political 
developments. The Scottish option, a parliament with law-making and taxation 
powers wins almost equal support across Wales with the exception of Cardiff  which 
is most sceptical of such a change. However, strongest support is expressed  almost 
equally in north and south; NW Wales with 42% and the Valleys with 43% . The 
figures suggest that a more cohesive Welsh attitude to devolution is emerging across 
the whole of Wales. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
Devolution and decentralisation in Wales and Brittany are best understood as two 
alternative forms of territorial institution building. We observed above that, in 
important respects, the Wales-Brittany comparison is asymmetrical. There are certain 
disadvantages in asymmetrical comparisons, but there are also countervailing 
arguments. As developed throughout this article, devolution and decentralisation 
present two alternative models: one focussed on territorial identity and polity 
building, the other on proximity as a response to policy solutions.  
 
 
Comparing comparable regions, even in distinctive institutional settings, allows for 
judgements to be made about the efficacy or otherwise of specific regional political 
institutions. A fuller comparison of devolution and decentralisation in Wales and 
Brittany would need to go beyond measuring institutional preferences, the purpose of 
this article. We need to develop an index that combines criteria drawn from the study 
of institutions, networks, social capital, identity formation, public policy co-ordination 
and central regulation.  Such an index would allow a more realistic appreciation of the 
potential for regional governance than a limited description of rule-making capacity.  
 
While awaiting such an exercise, the present article has focussed on comparing  
public opinion and political institutions in two neighbouring EU states. From our 
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empirical investigations we observe rather different processes at work in Brittany and 
Wales. Devolution in Wales emerges as a dynamic process with unintended 
consequences. When evaluating the potential for regional governance in Wales, we 
must draw a distinction between constitutional constraint and political dynamic. 
Constitutionally the power to act is spread across endless acts of parliament. 
Politically, a consensus is emerging within Wales for a strengthening of the powers of 
the Assembly. This consensus represents a paradigm shift by comparison even with 
the results of the Welsh referendum in 1997.  The question is no longer whether 
devolution will survive, but whether the Welsh Assembly should be given powers 
equivalent to those in Scotland. This consensus has solid support within public 
opinion.  
 
No such conclusion can be drawn in Brittany where, in spite of a strong undercurrent 
of support for a federal evolution, the status quo is the most widely supported 
position. Taken as a whole, Breton public opinion adopts a median position. There is 
little appetite for autonomy. This can be gauged by several criteria; the weak level of 
support for autonomist parties, the lack of consistent positions one way or the other 
from the main parties; the real, but limited constituency declaring itself in favour of 
autonomy; the Brittany specific focus of regional expenditure priorities. Bretons are 
widely attached to a legitimist form of regionalism. There is a strong sense of regional 
distinctiveness, but also a deeply embedded reluctance to transgress the established 
order. On the other hand, while respectful of established norms and processes, our 
findings suggest on balance that the Breton public would welcome a move towards 
greater regionalisation. Almost one half (45%) of the Breton public supported going 
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beyond the existing limited form of French decentralisation and adopting powers 
analogous to those of the Scottish parliament. 
 
Politicians in both regions refer to traditions, or ambitions of all-inclusivity.  Evidence 
from our quantitative and qualitative investigations suggests a more comfortable and 
harmonious relationship between identity, institutions and territory in the case of 
Brittany than in Wales. There is a definite tension between being British and being 
Welsh for around one-third of Welsh people.  The proportion of those constructing 
their Breton identity against being French is much weaker. Divisions within Breton 
society are less affirmed than in Wales, where linguistic, territorial and political 
divisions persist, in spite of a rallying to the new devolved institutions.  
 
Wales has a more developed system of political devolution than Brittany, but in many 
other respects it can learn from observing the French region. Welsh politicians tend to 
engage in aspirational comparisons with Catalonia, Ireland or Canada, but these are 
quite unrealistic. Welsh politicians need to encourage something akin to the pride in 
being Breton : that is,  a non-exclusive identity broadly shared across the political 
spectrum and within Breton society. Wales needs to look to the example of regions 
such as Brittany which harness their identity to developing a strong sense of social 
and human capital. 
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Notes  
                                                          
1
 Research for this article was carried out as part of the ESRC’s  Devolution and 
Constitutional Change programme (‘Devolution and Decentralisation in Wales and 
Brittany’: grant number L 219 25 2007). The award holders are Alistair Cole 
(principal researcher), Barry Jones, John Loughlin and Colin Williams. Alan Storer is 
the Research Assistant. The award is based in the School of European Studies at 
Cardiff University (the Department of Welsh is also involved). We thank the Council 
for its support. 
 
2
 Market Research Wales and Efficience 3 simultaneously carried out the  public 
opinion surveys  in Wales and Brittany in June and July 2001. A representative 
sample of 1007, selected by quotas of age, gender, socio-economic group and locality, 
was interviewed in each region.  
3
  These examples were those most frequently cited in extensive interviews in and 
around the National Assembly for Wales in 2001 and 2002. Interviews took place in 
the following organisations: the National Assembly for Wales,   ELWa, the CCETs, 
business organisations (CBI, FSB, Chambers-Wales, IoD, House-Builders Federation, 
the Economic Fora), trade unions ( TUC, GMB, Unify), WEFO, WDA, local 
government,  WLB,  New Deal Taskforce, CCW, European Commission,  EOC.  
Interviews are ongoing. All  interviewees were guaranteed anonymity. 
 
4
 Direct election is a slight misnomer. Up to and including 1998, elections for the 
French regional councils  took place on the basis of departmental party lists.  The 
proportional representation system used – a 5% threshold and the ‘highest average’ 
methods of allocating votes to seats – marginally favoured the larger parties. The 
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electoral constituency for the 2004 elections will probably be that of the region, rather 
than the départements.  
 
5
 The precise results were as follows: strongly in favour 11 per cent, in favour 40 per 
cent, against 19 per cent,  strongly against 13 per cent, don’t know 18 per cent. 
 
6
  The second priority in Wales was education (33 per cent), followed by health (26 
per cent) 
7
 The situation is, however, regionally differentiated.  In relation to education, 
standards across Wales are very varied, with high levels in rural areas, but much 
lower ones in the declining industrial areas,  especially in the valleys.  The pattern for 
health is rather similar.  The valleys are a  health black-spot, where the situation is 
compounded by the high rate of respiratory illnesses. As in Brittany,  demands on 
healthcare are exacerbated by the high numbers of elderly pensioners retiring in 
Wales.  
 
8
  In the case of Brittany, 43,5 per cent favoured the Regional Council as the 
appropriate level for  training policy, followed by 24.5 per cent for local government, 
20,5 per cent  for central government and only 3,1 per cent for the European Union.  
In the case of Wales the figures were the Assembly (41,5 per cent) the UK 
government (25.3 per cent), local government (23,4 per cent) and the European Union 
(3,1 per cent).  
 
